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How do US-China relations impact US relations with other Asian nations, specifically 
with India and Japan?  US-China relations can be seen as the main driver in US relations with 
Japan and India following rapprochement with the United States. The inverse relationship that 
exists between US-China and US-Japan/US-India relations signals the importance of the US’ 
bilateral relationship with China. While there are significant differences between the US-India 
and US-Japan relations, both are similarly affected by US-China relations. The critical time 
period explored in this paper is the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict of 1969. This time period 
explores the impact of US-China relations on Asian relations within the context of the US-USSR 
Cold War rivalry, and China’s role in breaking from the Communist bloc and its disapproval of 
Soviet revisionism. The Nixon Administration and its foreign policy initiatives, namely, 
rapprochement with China has changed the course of US foreign policy.  
  





















How do US – China relations impact US relations with other Asian nations, specifically with 
India and Japan? 
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Power Management 
            China has been growing, politically and economically, calling US hegemony into 
question. The US has attempted containment measures, but the US has not been able to contain 
China on its own for years. The US has been engaging many nations to assist in Sino 
containment; however, in this specific case Japan and India will be of the greatest significance. 
This has created strategic triangular relationships between the US-Japan-China and US-India-
China as well as quadrilateral cooperation among the US, Japan. India, and Australia.  
In the international system, balance of power, collective security, and world government 
are the top three approaches to power management (Claude, Jr. 1989). Balance of power theory 
is believed to maintain power and to be a method that prevents war with an objective of 
safeguarding national sovereignty which stabilizes the international order. There is a focus 
within balance of power on rivalrous nations and the interactions of great powers. The theory 
assumes that states must engage in balancing behavior if they wish to survive since in the 
anarchic system, survival is not guaranteed (Waltz 1967, 215). States seek allies to maintain 
balance of power, as aggregating the capabilities of other states can balance against the 
increasing power of a rival; powerful states may seek to disrupt alliances and encourage 
defection from a rival alliance (Waltz 1967, 218). 
Since the establishment of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, balance of power theory has 
been maintained through the formation of alliances (Monticone 2008). Prior to the end of World 
War II, balance-of-power politics were characterized by flexible alignments among major 
powers. Balance of power theory builds off of the diplomatic foundation of a nation’s ability to 
make, maintain, and break alliances (Waltz 1967). Monticone (2008) presents three alliance 
systems that safeguard the balance (499). The first of the alliance systems posits two alliances 
against each other; within their alliances, the states are trying to alter the balance of power.  The 
second system posits two alliances where one is trying to maintain the status quo, and the other 
alliance tries to overturn the status quo. The third system posits two alliances of equal strength 
against a balancer. Since 1648, the balance has been through different phases which revolve 
around two major conflicts: World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII). The balance since 
World War II became inflexible due to the reduction in major powers, the creation of a bipolar 
system as the US and USSR emerged as the two superpowers in the world, and the formation of 
a two-bloc system. As previous major powers like Britain and Japan became firmly committed 
members of the U.S.-led alliance, newly independent nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
became the focus of competition for allies; given that the two superpowers were so much more 
powerful than other states, the US and USSR did not need to bend to the will of third parties in 
their respective alliances (Monticone 2008, 499-504; Waltz 1967, 219). The bipolar system made 
for general stability insofar as neither superpower needed to worry that shifts in the alignments 
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of states would seriously affect its vital interests; nonetheless, the US and USSR both worked to 
maintain their relative power vis-à-vis the other and were “sensitive to the gains of the other” 
(Waltz 1967, 230).  
However, once the Soviet Union fell and the Warsaw Pact ended, flexibility became even 
less important as the US was left as sole superpower, creating a unipolar system (Monticone 
2008). Scholars debated how unipolarity would affect balance-of-power dynamics, with some 
arguing that other states would not balance against the United States (such as Wohlforth 1999 
and Brooks and Wohlforth 2005), others predicting soft balancing (such as Paul 2018 and Walt 
2005) and yet others anticipating hard balancing (such as Layne 2012 and Fortmann 2004). 
Analysts who emphasized soft balancing focused on the ways in which other states used 
international institutions, economic statecraft and diplomatic arrangements “that do not directly 
challenge US military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and 
undermine aggressive unilateral US military policies” (Pape 2005, 10). Hard balancing through 
formal military alliances and arms build-ups were arguably avoided due to the need for 
continued cooperation with the United States due to economic interdependence and other shared 
interests. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, structural realists pointed to evidence of 
counter-hegemonic balancing against the United States on the part of Russia (Steff and Khoo 
2014) and other states.  
Current politics, with US hegemony challenged, speaks to the use of alliances in order to 
form a superior balance. Balance of power theory, however, remains elusive as there is a failure 
to distinguish balance of power as a system of equilibrium versus being a system of “competitive 
manipulation of power relationships” (Claude, Jr. 1989, 77). This failure results from 
ambiguities. There are no known expectations on how to balance power and how it should play 
out in the international system. Exact balances can be viewed as situations which invite war. This 
situation is summed by Winston Churchill who stated, “If you wish to bring about war, you bring 
about such a balance that both sides think they have a chance of winning. If you want to stop 
war, you gather such as aggression of force on one side that the aggressor, whoever he may be, 
will dare not challenge” (Claude, Jr. 1989, 79). Alliances may not work to balance when it is 
posited against another alliance which is equally powerful; this rather than solving a balance 
issue creates an insecure environment where conflict may emerge. This is why forming more 
powerful alliances that are visible to the aggressor are necessary. Visible alliances allow 
powerful states to use other ways to force their wills, such as coercion, economic bargaining, and 
foreign aid, rather than force (Waltz 1967). Powerful states are better able to balance power and 
are better able to avoid the use of force in their agendas.   
The political system and ideology of a state holds weight within the balance of power.  
Ideological differences attribute to a state’s identity which is a factor within the balance (Nau 
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2003). Kenneth Waltz recognizes the effects of ideology; however, he views variations in power 
to be the primary factor in the balance of power (Nau 2003, 213). This implies “political 
ideology, economic system, [and] governmental institutions” as important secondary factors 
within the balance (213). Yet, constructivists view identity as the driver of balance of power 
which makes the political system and ideology a major factor in balance of power. The 
constructivists view state image as a driver of power; this view argues that the USSR failed due 
to its own image as a communist power which did not work within the internet and information 
revolution (214). Whether constructivist or realist, political systems and ideology impact the 
interactions and balance of power between states. In Asian relations, the combined realist and 
constructivist ideas on the balance of power are two important factors to recognize within Asian 
political “patterns” (214).  
Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, believed the US needed to be the balancer in 
Asia because a united Asia would possess too many resources and could cripple US national 
interests (Monticone 2008, 508). Kissinger furthered that the US needed to resist efforts by any 
nation to dominate Asia, even an Asian nation, such as China today. During the Cold War, this 
meant countering the threat of Soviet hegemony in Asia. After the end of the Cold War, when 
America was the sole superpower, the United States did not need to worry about threats to its 
interests in Asia, but with the rise of China as an economic and military superpower, containing 
China is the central focus of U.S. policy; however, with America’s relative decline, the US 
cannot do so alone, and it must encourage “the emergence of new power centers in Asia” 
(Monticone 2008, 509). The rise of China has contributed to the US’ use of a hard balancing 
strategy, using alliances and military to balance, while also utilizing soft balancing (Paul 2018).   
A key US ally in Asia since the end of World War II has been the democratic state of 
Japan. Japan has been essential to US communist containment measures during the Cold War 
and is to this day considered the “cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific 
and across the world” (US Department of State 2021). The past 60 years have witnessed the 
efficacy of the US-Japanese strategic security alliance. Japan and China contest territory and share 
a recently violent history, as imperialist Japan occupied China for years. While occupation lies in 
history, resentment remains. One other important nation the US has been grooming to become 
the next major power in Asia is India. Being a democratic nation bordering China, an 
authoritarian state, India is strategically located and allied to the democracies of the West (Panda 
& Baruah 2019). Increasingly, India has been looking to extends its own influence which it has 
accomplished through cooperation with nations, such as the US, Japan, and Australia. Schweller 
(2011) believes that the growth of India and China will cause a rethinking of how world politics 
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is understood, as the rise of these nations is occurring while the US is declining, and its time as 
the sole superpower is becoming limited.  India has the resources and manpower to balance for 
China in the region; however, India had fallen behind for many years and social scientists now 
predict by 2030 India should become a major world power (Monticone 2008). India has fostered 
a closer relationship with the US as it perceives China as a greater threat to its national 
sovereignty (Kaura 2018). Additionally, Japan and India have become economically and 
strategically more dependent which could be considered a powerful balance in the region to 
China (Panda & Baruah 2019). It is believed the main purpose of the allegiance is to pressure 
China to keep itself in check.  China remains cognizant of Sino containment efforts in the 
region.   
As the US experiences its fall from hegemony and a multipolar world comes into 
existence, balance of power will be essential for US foreign policy goals. Engaging with nations 
such as Japan and India in Asia will be the key. The US has long not been able to contain 
China’s rise alone yet keeping China in check with the help of these two Asian democracies 
should help the US maintain a position of strength and national interests.  
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Theory  
The relations between the US-China not only influence these two countries’ bilateral 
relations but influence third parties and the international community as well. US-China relations 
set the tone in the international community, whether cooperative or hostile. Increasing 
competition between the nations can cause instability in the international order; Chinese 
challenges have already chipped away at U.S. hegemony and the liberal international order. If 
the era of U.S. supremacy comes to an end and China rises to the position of hegemon, it could 
signal the ineffectiveness of democracy and the rise of authoritarian leadership. I believe this 
could ultimately change the fabric of the international order and of democracy.     
The US-China cooperation “is the most complex bilateral relationship for the United 
States” (Hamilton, 2003). Since China’s emergence to the forefront of the international order, 
US-China relations have experienced varying degrees of competition, cooperation, hostility, and 
conflict. In these past few years under the Trump Administration, the declaration of genocide 
within China and the culmination of the trade war set the stage for the new decade, a decade of 
disagreements between the two powers. These disagreements have implications beyond the US 
and China. For example, Taiwan’s right to self-determination is influenced by US-China 
relations. Taiwan is a territory claimed by China but has been increasingly cooperative with the 
United States in hopes of formal recognition which would undermine the One China Policy. 
Taiwan is not just a territory, but a very controversial topic in US-China relations. Not only 
economics and security are important in US-China relations, but politics. 
There is uncertainty within US-China relations which requires the United States to form a 
regional balance should the relations between the US and China sour. Ideally, the balance would 
include nations which are regional rivals to China and have the ability to match its influence and 
power. The nations would likely have similarities with the US which allows them to better 
cooperate, such as economic standing, values, membership within organizations, or government 
systems. In Asia, two nations are very important in promoting US foreign policy and dominance 
in the US-China relations. India is a growing economy with a population rivaling the size of 
China’s. Additionally, India is the world’s largest democracy who has its own border (territory) 
conflicts with China. Within Asia, China and India have a growing rivalry as India continues to 
develop and looks to balance China and its regional partner, Pakistan. The other nation which 
has been central to US foreign policy initiatives in Asia since after the Second World War is 
Japan. A developed Asian nation which has hostile relations with China especially in terms of 
China’s sea claims, Japan has been an important US ally for decades. Cooperation within the 
US-Japan-China trilateral relation and the US-India-China relation could prove to be a very 
powerful and influential.  
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Hostility within US-China relations affects nations around the world. Hostility occurs 
when a disagreement, whether economic or political, occurs between the two states. This can 
result in military exercises, possible cyber-attacks, or the use of harsh, critical language toward 
one another on the world stage. This hostility directly affects US relations with other states in 
Asia. Hostile relations can lead to retaliation and possibly lead to each state coming to “the brink 
of war” with one another. Hostile relations between the United States and China can also lead to 
stronger U.S. relations with third parties such as India and Japan. Increased conflict between the 
US and China, creates more cooperation between the US, India, and Japan.   
Rivalry and competition have driven the US to form balances against China. China has 
been growing politically, economically, and militarily. Politically, China has been implementing 
expansionist policies, which have conflicted with the national interests of the United States, 
especially freedom of navigation of the seas in the South China Sea. Economically, these sea 
routes are important for international trade, thus implicating this as an issue which affects more 
nations than the US. However, these policies are also seen through foreign lending, such as the 
One Belt One Road Initiative, and most recently vaccination distribution during the Covid-19 
pandemic. Militarily, China has been expanding the capacity of the People’s Liberation Army 
and Navy. China’s naval challenges could prove to be complicating for the US as its own Navy 
suffers from lack of innovation and improvements (Heritage Foundation 2020). China is and has 
been sowing its influence around the world, which some argue erodes the influence of the United 
States.   
As China looks to overtake the US, US relations with Japan and India will become a tool 
to counter China’s rising power. I argue that US-India and US-Japan relations are influenced by 
how the rivalry between the US and China proceeds. US relations with India and Japan are not 
independent of Sino-American but rather dependent on these. A hostile China is a risk for the US 
and requires allies to balance. It is also a risk for India and Japan to have a hostile China within 
the region. Therefore, the trilateral relationship must work within a political, economic, and 
military framework.  Political, economic, and military cooperation within the trilateral 
relationship could prove be an alternative for hostility which allows the US and China to avoid 
the Thucydides Trap, as termed by political scientist Graham T. Allison to refer to the likelihood 
of war when a rising power (whether China or Athens) threatens a status quo power (whether the 
United States or Sparta). Avoiding this trap is essential; however, this is harder to achieve than it 
seems. as the historical record shows that most challenges by rising states to the current hegemon 
ends in war (Allison 2017). 
Despite the complexity of their relations, I argue that an inverse relationship exists 
between US-China relations and US-Japan/US-India relations. When the relations between the 
US and China have been less hostile, there has been less of a need for a balance and less of a 
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need for the India and Japan. However, in time of hostility and conflict this relationship between 
the US, Japan and India could maintain peace by making the expected costs of war much higher 
for China as it now engages not only the US but the combined forces of the US and two of its 
regional rivals thus avoiding the Thucydides Trap. Raising the costs and lowering the expected 
utility of Chinese expansionism is essential in decreasing the likelihood of conflict. A conflict 
between these four nations could prove to be disastrous; an effective trilateral cooperation will 
make conflict too expensive for China, thus maintaining peace.  
The trilateral cooperation works toward a goal of securing sovereignty. The US has 
experienced infringement upon its sovereignty from China through intellectual property rights 
theft and the hackings of government and private businesses within the US. China has infringed 
upon India’s sovereignty through its territorial claims along the two nations’ border, some of 
which China has taken control over. Japan has experienced infringement upon its sovereignty 
with Chinese territorial claims in the China Sea. These nations have a common interest of 
securing their national sovereignty from Chinese intervention. The trilateral relationships 
respond to China’s accusations of the US, Japan, and India’s infringements upon China’s own 
national sovereignty. China accuses the US of infringing on China’s sovereignty within the 
South China Sea, India of occupying Arunachal Pradesh and Galwan Valley (among many 
border territorial disputes), and Japan of infringing on China’s sovereignty within the East China 
Sea.  
Due to the risk of China’s rising power and expansionist policies, the United States has 
formed a trilateral security alliance with Japan and India. This alliance responds to shocks within 
the relationship maintained by the US and China. Sino-American relations affect those between 
the US, India, and Japan in their cooperative alliance. In comparing state relations, when US-
China relations are hostile, US-India and US-Japan relations improve; when US-China relations 
are cooperative, US-India and US-Japan relations become less important for the US’ foreign 
policy goals. It is an inverse relationship that exists which means the US must place much 
emphasis on its most complicated bilateral relationship with China. As China grows and 
challenges the US politically, economically, and militarily, the US must strengthen relations with 
Asian allies in order to guarantee security and its position within the international order. The 
implications of the US China relationship resonate through the international community. It 
increasingly seems that US-China relations have soured beyond return and that the ideology that 
separates the nations has created an insurmountable divide. What occurs between these two 
powerful nations sets the stage for what will be. “What will be” affects not only economic 
security, but national sovereignty and security for other nations. A fallout between China and the 
US could alter the political landscape of the world; if the United States is unable to prevent 
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China from becoming a global hegemon, it could signal the failure of democracy and the rise of 

























In comparing state relations, when US-China relations are hostile, US-India and US-
Japan relations improve; when US-China relations are cooperative, US-India and US-Japan 
relations become less important for the US’ foreign policy goals. It is an inverse relationship that 
exists, and the US must give much attention to its most complicated bilateral relationship with 
China. In addition to this inverse relationship, it is important to recognize the significant 
differences between the US-Japan and US-India relationship due to secondary factors such as 
historical interaction, autonomy, presidential preferences, and presidential personality.  
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Research Design   
To test this hypothesis, this paper uses qualitative methods, specifically case studies. I 
will be conducting case studies analyzing how bilateral relations between the United States and 
Japan are influenced by the dominant relationship between the US and China. Additionally, I 
will conduct a case study of US-India relations in contrast to US-China relations. I also will 
explore how the US, India, and Japan have formed a trilateral relationship in Asia and how this 
relationship is utilized in order to contain China. 
Information on these cases comes from official government websites, academic articles, 
and news sources that analyze historical interactions between the US and China during critical 
time periods in the nations’ histories. I utilized the memoirs of leaders and official government 
statements and explored the circumstances during which they occurred. I also researched 
agreements and treaties signed during these two time periods. Additionally, the use of alliances 
will be researched. After reviewing the history of foreign relations between the two nations post-
World War II, the time period that will be analyzed will be March 1969 when the Sino-Soviet 
Border Conflict occurred, subsequent research will focus on the post-One China Policy Reagan 
years and the Trump Trade War. This paper is part of a larger project which will focus on three 
critical time periods in total that compare foreign policy and the impact of US-China relations 
during three Republican presidencies. During March of 1969, US and China’s relations were 
cooperative and improving, while during Reagan’s presidency and Trump’s presidency, the US 
and China found themselves in hostile territory.  
The 1969 Border Conflict arose between the Soviet Union and China. The dispute left the 
US on better footing with the Chinese government, as they moved away from the Soviet Union. 
China began recognizing the US as an ally during this period and the Soviet Union as an 
aggressor. During this time period the US had also been interacting with India and Japan. In this 
analysis, US-China relations will be the independent variable that affects how US-India and US-
Japan relations are conducted. US-China relations determine how US relations with India and 
Japan move forward; US-India and US-Japan relations are reactive. The triangular relationships 
(US-India-China and US-Japan-China) are driven by the bilateral relation between the United 
States and China within this triangle. I estimate that as US-China relations become more hostile 
or uncooperative, US-India and US-Japan relations become more cooperative. I predict an 
inverse relationship.   
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1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Introduction  
To understand the progression of US-Chinese relations in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the 
context of the US-USSR balance must be acknowledged. The PRC worked within the Soviet 
bloc until the emergence of Soviet revisionism; the term revisionism was used by Mao to 
emphasize the USSR’s straying from Marx and Lennon’s communist ideology. This revisionism 
caused a rift in the USSR’s relationship with the PRC. This rift led to an opportunity for the US 
to improve relations with China as the USSR and China experienced growing hostility. In 1969 
during the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, the US began its tilt toward China and its rapprochement 
with Mao Zedong’s government. The US was able to normalize relations with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) due to the growing hostility, which broke into conflict, between the 
USSR and the PRC. This conflict emerged over territory and ideology as the PRC labeled the 
USSR as revisionist, and China believed itself to be the face of communist leadership. While 
China and the US improved relations, U.S. bilateral relations with Japan and India worsened. 
The Nixon Administration, which became focused on rapprochement with China, overlooked its 
fellow democracies in the region, so much so that US-India relations hit an all-time low; Japan 
during this period became less confident in its relations with the US. This section begins with a 
focus on the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict; the second subsection investigates US foreign policy 
toward China during the Nixon Administration; the third assesses the impact of rapprochement 
on US-Japan bilateral relations; the fourth assesses US-India bilateral relations as a consequence 
of rapprochement.   
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The Conflict 
Despite close relations between the USSR and PRC in the 1950s, tensions between the 
two communist powers steadily increased, culminating in an open split by the end of the decade. 
On February 14, 1950, the USSR and the PRC, signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and 
Mutual Assistance against Japan (Gerson 2010). By 1957, the countries signed another treaty, 
New Defense Technical Accord, in which the Soviet Union agreed to assist the PRC in building 
an atomic bomb prototype. While relations between Mao and Stalin were better relative to those 
with Stalin’s successors, Mao still took offense to the treatment of the PRC by Stalin. With 
Stalin’s death in 1953, the new Premier of the USSR became Nikita Khrushchev, who believed 
that “conflict with China [was] “inevitable” (Gerson 2010, 7) Mao began to believe that the 
Soviet Union wanted to control the PRC and he marked the hostility between the two nations as 
beginning in 1958. The hostility stemmed from lacking communication between the USSR and 
PRC and ended, according to Mao, leaving China with developmental and economic issues 
(Schram 2020). 
In 1959, Khrushchev withdrew from the New Defense Technical Accord, and by 1960, 
he withdrew Soviet personnel from China (Gerson 2010). In 1962, during the China-India border 
conflict, Khrushchev took a pro-India stance while cutting aid to the PRC (Jian 1995). As the 
Soviet Union became a greater threat to the Chinese, the two countries agreed to border 
negotiations in Beijing in 1964 which lasted five months. By October Khrushchev was removed 
from his position as premier and the Chinese hoped for better relations; however, under the new 
leadership of Leonid Brezhnev the tensions continued to rise with an increasing Soviet troop 
presence along the Sino-Soviet Border and the USSR signed a treaty with Mongolia against the 
PRC in 1966 (Jian 1995; “Mongolia” 1966). 1967 saw China’s first hydrogen bomb tests, 
following which the USSR increased troops on the border once again (Hahn 1989; Rice 1973). 
Along with troop buildup, the Soviets in 1967 moved nuclear weapons, the SS-12 Tactical 
Nuclear System, to the border which upset China’s regional balance of power in Asia (Rice 
1973). Additionally, these weapons were seen as a way for the Soviet Union to balance the large 
population of the PRC. In 1968, a fight at the border left four Chinese citizens dead; also in 
1968, the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia as a part of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified 
Soviet intervention in other communist nations based on the argument that any threat to socialist 
rule in any member of the Soviet bloc was a threat to them all. While the invasion took place, the 
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USSR flew planes into Chinese airspace. The Chinese saw the USSR as a threat to their 
sovereignty, especially after the Czechoslovakian invasion.   
Ideological differences between the USSR and PRC created yet another source of 
conflict. Beginning in 1966, Mao initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, also known 
as the Cultural Revolution, which purged Chinese society of alleged bourgeoisie who were not 
committed to his communist vision (Lieberthal 2020). Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 
part due to fears that Soviet-style revisionism might lead to the degeneration of the party. Mao 
closed schools during this period and encouraged the youth in China to join the Red Guards. The 
Red Guards were a paramilitary organization comprised of high school and college students who 
followed Mao in his fight against revisionism (Editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica 2016). 
These students became rebels who under Mao’s instruction aimed to destroy China’s historical 
culture. The movement became violent as many intellectuals and elderly in the PRC were 
assaulted and/or killed (Lieberthal 2020). The Red Guards were involved in hundreds of 
thousands of persecutions (Editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica 2016). The revolution revived 
Mao’s cult of personality and eliminated those in the party who had opposed Mao’s leadership 
(Lieberthal 2020).  
In the United States, the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency set the stage for a 
shift in foreign policy. Nixon’s influential national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, criticized 
the previous administration for its involvement in Vietnam and sought to move away from a sole 
focus on the U.S.-Soviet struggle for power by encouraging allies to contribute more toward their 
own defense. Nixon’s approach to foreign policy and the international community, prioritized the 
development of relations with China (Gerson 2010). Balancing Soviet influence remained a goal 
of the US as it had been since 1947. In 1947, President Truman issued the self-titled Truman 
Doctrine which promised military, economic, and political aid to democracies which were being 
infiltrated by communist Soviet influences. A hallmark of containment, the Truman Doctrine 
guided US foreign policy toward the USSR, until its fall (Adams n.d.). Truman declared, “"It 
must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" (Adams n.d.). Nixon during his tenure 
adopted his own self-titled doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine, which would shift US foreign policy in 
the region. This Nixon Doctrine recognized US commitments; however, it limited its ground 
troop commitments; this shift in policy would not allow for the US to send troops in future 
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conflicts, but it guarantees the provisions of economic and military aid (Samuels 2019). The US 
began to disassociate the PRC from the communist bloc under Soviet influence; during this time, 
relations would come to materialize between the US and PRC with Soviet hostility and Pakistani 
assistance.  
An important consequence of the growing rift between the USSR and PRC was the 
decision on the part of the PRC to decrease its support for the North Vietnamese, while the 
USSR pursued increasingly better relations with North Vietnam (Jian 1995). This followed years 
of close relations in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s between the PRC and the North 
Vietnamese. Whereas the PRC had previously promised, “unconditional support” to the 
Vietcong “by all possible and necessary means,” the Sino-Soviet split led the PRC to recall all 
personnel from the Vietnam War by the end of March 1969; 1969 also saw Chinese provisions 
for the Vietcong’s cause plummet (Jian 1995, 360-361). Under Mao’s leadership, balance of 
power became central to policies and that explains Chinese openness to rapprochement following 
the deterioration of relations between the USSR and the PRC during the Vietnam War and the 
1969 border conflict (Cheng 1998). 
In 1969, territorial disputes and ideological conflict came to a head at Zhenbao Island, 
which the Soviets knew as Damansky Island, where the USSR had stationed between 270,000 
and 290,000 men (Gerson 2010). The PRC demanded that the USSR return this territory to 
China and acknowledge that the 1860 Treaty of Peking, which ceding Chinese territory to czarist 
Russia, was an unequal treaty imposed by an imperialist power on a weak China. The Soviet 
Union was unwilling to offer such an acknowledgement since doing so would not only allow 
China, but other border countries to request territory adjustments, including Japan who lost 
territory to the USSR following WWII (Central Intelligence Agency 1969). The USSR could not 
accept the terms of the Chinese and the border conflict ensued.   
On the 2nd of March, the Chinese ambushed Soviet troops with the hope of deterring a 
Soviet attack (Gerson 2010). By the 15th, border skirmishes continued, and the USSR began the 
exchange of fire along the border. Celebrating the anniversary of V-E day on May 9th, the USSR 
labeled the US, China, and West Germany as its “major foes” (Kissinger 1979, 177). Fighting 
continued throughout the summer as peace negotiations stalled. On the 13th of August, Soviet 
troops ambushed soldiers in Xinjiang, killing 38 Chinese soldiers (Gerson 2010). During the 
conflict the USSR threatened nuclear retaliation, and the USSR went as far as to ask other 
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nations, including the US, what their response would be should the Soviet Union use its nuclear 
capabilities against the PRC (Gerson 2010). The US publicly disclosed the nuclear threat the 
USSR had inquired about; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became concerned. On August 
28th, the CCP Central Committee called for war preparations, including the building of 
underground shelters (Kissinger 1979).  
On the 11th of September in 1969, the USSR and the PRC came to an agreement over the 
border dispute (Gerson 2010). Chinese fear of a nuclear attack from the USSR led China to 
cultivate its relations in the US which was the best path for the PRC to take in order to safeguard 
its national sovereignty. This allowed China not only to rely on its own nuclear capabilities, but 
it gave China the opportunity to fall within the US nuclear umbrella. The conflict between the 
USSR and PRC allowed Nixon and Kissinger to exploit the growing division between the two 
communist powers to the US’ advantage.  
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US Foreign Policy during the 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflict  
 
“A key requisite to the success of the Nixon Administration-Kissinger foreign policy 
operation hinged on careful manipulation of the bureaucracy, the public, and Congress 
by resorted to secrecy and evasion.” – Asaf Siniver 2008, 149  
 
US foreign policy under Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger was marked by secrecy and 
poor communication, especially surrounding the role and compliance of the bureaucracy. The 
Nixon Administration promoted a decision-making process which was hierarchical in nature 
with many decisions made during private meetings between Kissinger and Nixon who often 
ignored the advice of others within the US government, especially the US State Department 
(Siniver 2008; US Department of State n.d., “Nixon’s Foreign Policy”).  Kissinger ran 
“interdepartmental groups” that sought to “instill the necessary discipline in the bureaucracy and 
ensure it operated in accordance with Nixon’s priorities” and “to involve bureaucracy in the 
process, as it was ultimately charged with executing the decisions made at the White House” 
(Siniver 2008, 180). For his part, Nixon preferred to consult separately with Kissinger; Nixon 
has been quoted saying, “no more goddamn meetings to decide this” (Siniver 2008, 175). The 
Nixon Administration undermined the process within the US, through bureaucratic controls and 
the ignorance of fellow governmental departments, which made Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign 
policy initiates more difficult to pursue. This undermining shows how Nixon and Kissinger held 
their grip on power which allowed them to carry out their own foreign policy initiatives.  
In 1969, Nixon issued the Guam Doctrine, which has since become known as the Nixon 
Doctrine, which limited US military commitment (ground troops) in Asia Pacific (Hoey 2012, 
53) This doctrine, spurred by ongoing US military involvement in Vietnam, acknowledged the 
US could no longer commit to protect Asian nations alone; Asian nations needed to take their 
security into their own hands with continued US assistance limited to nuclear deterrence and 
naval and air commitments. For Nixon and Kissinger, Vietnam demonstrated that the US had 
overextended its reach in Asia, and Nixon’s conservative policy looked to “conserve American 
strength” (Hoey 2012, 53). This was seen for many nations reliant on US military support in Asia 
as an abandonment of America’s duties to its allies, even though the administration insisted that 
it would continue to honor its commitment to its allies.  
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Nixon hoped to use improved relations with the USSR and PRC to pressure North 
Vietnam to end the war; to this end, he and Kissinger pursued a policy of triangulation that 
sought to play China and the Soviet Union against each other. The Nixon Administration’s 
further foreign policy goals looked to secure a détente between the US and the USSR, to come to 
an agreement on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), pursue rapprochement with 
China, and the US withdraw of troops from Vietnam (US Department of State n.d., “Nixon’s 
Foreign Policy”). US involvement in Asia was of strategic importance due to the presence of the 
two dominating communist powers (Khan 1985). This importance was born of the US’ relations 
to the USSR and PRC in 1969 as “the principal determinant of the U.S. policy towards South 
Asia has been the U.S. perception of the region’s relevance to the pursuit of its global economic, 
geopolitical and strategic goals” (Khan 1985, 84) This denotes why changes in US policy in Asia 
occur, it has been reactionary to the current hostilities within US-Soviet and US-Chinese 
relations. This is especially true considering the 1969 border conflict and the period of 
rapprochement.  
During rapprochement, Nixon looked to use China as a balance within the region to 
counter Soviet influence. This strategic triangle of power was seen as a route to “transform the 
bipolar world of the Cold War… in such a way so that Sino-American relations and US-Soviet 
relations would be better than Sino-Soviet relations (Cheng 1998, 254). Nixon’s policy of 
rapprochement is recognized as historic and may have been only possible due to his conservative 
credentials as a fervent anti-communist politician, which gave him the political space to improve 
relations with Mao (Cheng 1998). Mao believed Republicans were more wary of the Soviets and 
their spreading communist influence than their Democratic counterparts and thus favored 
dealings with them regarding the Sino-Soviet split.  
Nixon’s hope of rapprochement seemed to be confirmed in July of 1969. On July 16, 
1969, a yacht capsized off the coast of Hong Kong which had two Americans as crewmembers; 
the crew were taken in by the Chinese (Kissinger 1979, 180). The Nixon Administration awaited 
to see what would occur to the Americans as the Chinese were experiencing their Cultural 
Revolution. The Chinese government kept it silent and did not turn the incident into a campaign 
against the US. On the 21st the State Department loosened trade and travel restrictions against the 
PRC. Three days following this announcement, the Chinese government released the 
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crewmembers. Kissinger noted these two events required no reciprocity; however, “Peking had 
understood” (1979, 180).  
Nixon was engaged in an international tour in 1969 and was leaving hints that the US was 
ready to engage in communication with the PRC (Kissinger 1979). Nixon spoke bluntly with 
Yahya Khan, leader of Pakistan, discussing his personal view, which he recognized was the 
minority view shared by Americans, that China could no longer remain isolated. Nixon asked 
Yahya to “convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level” as Pakistan was a close ally of 
the PRC (Kissinger 1979, 180-181). On August 8th, Secretary of State William P. Rogers 
delivered in Canberra a speech on US intentions with China stating:  
We have been seeking to open up channels of communication. Just in a few days we have 
liberalized our policies toward purchase of their goods by American travelers and toward 
validating passports for travel to China. Our purpose was to remove irritants in our 
relations and help remind the people of mainland China of our historic friendship for 
them (Kissinger 1979, 182).  
Rapprochement with China was not only on Nixon’s agenda, but it was advantageous for the 
United States due to the ongoing Vietnam War. Improved relations with China could pressure 
the Soviet Union to improve its own relations with the United States and easing of Cold War 
tensions could help to “diplomatically isolate North Vietnam” and pressure North Vietnam to 
end the war (US Department of State n.d., “Milestones”). Additionally, the US was looking to 
avoid conflict by befriending communist nations and playing them against each other, which 
could cause a break in the communist alliance and improve America’s geopolitical position (Rice 
1973).    
During the 1969 Border Conflict, the US had to decide whether to align with either the 
USSR or China or remain neutral. If the US supported China, relations with Moscow would 
deteriorate and détente would be put at risk (Gerson 2010). If the US aligned with Moscow, the 
US feared China’s reemergent influence on the Vietnam War. Kissinger called this conflict the 
“opportunity… that China might be ready to reenter the diplomatic arena and that would require 
it to soften its previous hostility toward the United States” (Kissinger 1979, 177). However, if the 
US did not proceed with caution the Chinese might reject an overture due to its ongoing Cultural 
Revolution or Moscow might see the overture as a reason for an attack. The US ultimately 
decided to remain neutral, yet the US did tilt toward China.  
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The tilt toward China began during the Sino-Soviet border conflict and continued to be 
the strategy of the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy goals in securing triangular relations 
(Goh 2005).  The 1969 border conflict was the opportunity for Nixon to involve the US with the 
PRC as both nations saw a common enemy in the USSR. While the US professed balance 
between its relations with the PRC and the USSR, the US “subtly tilted toward the Chinese” 
(Goh 2005, 478). The tilt and triangular relations would not have been possible without 
Pakistan’s role as intermediary. The US prioritized its relations with China; however, Mao and 
the PRC saw this opportunity of rapprochement for détente, not for an ally. 
Rapprochement ended “a generation during which [US and Chinese] relations were 
frozen in hostility” (Rice 1973, 805). For the Chinese, rapprochement had its advantages as it 
allowed the PRC to avoid a possible US attack from Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan, or Okinawa. 
Rapprochement formally began with Nixon’s visit to China in 1972; however, the foundation for 
rapprochement was laid when Mao invited the US ping pong team to visit China in April of 1971 
following the Table Tennis Championships in Japan (Cheng 1998; Eckstein 1993). This began a 
period termed as “Ping Pong Diplomacy” between the US and the PRC.  
The travel of the US ping pong team to China in 1971 required government intervention 
as the US had travel restrictions on China in place (Eckstein 1993). On April 10, 1971 the US 
ping pong team entered China; just days after team USA’s entrance, Premier Zhou Enlai gave a 
speech acknowledging a “new beginning” and “friendship” between the US and the PRC 
(Eckstein 1993, 328). On the 14th of April, Nixon adjusted US trade policies toward China and 
removed the travel ban on China. In July, Kissinger traveled to China on a secret trip which was 
followed by Nixon’s official trip to China. The Chinese ping pong team traveled to the US and 
toured the nation in 1972. The Chinese team was paraded around the US and visited Nixon in the 
White House’s Rose Garden. In the Rose Garden, Nixon called the US and the PRC “big 
winners” due to their engagement in a new friendship (Eckstein 1993, 336). Following these 
events, Zhou promised that Beijing would not abandon rapprochement with the US due to 
escalation in the Vietnam War. Ping Pong diplomacy was an essential maneuver in restoring 
relations with the PRC; the foundations laid by Ping Pong diplomacy would guide US foreign 
policy initiatives carried out by the Nixon Administration.  
The United States’ policy of rapprochement with China ended hostilities that reigned 
between the two nations since the founding of Red China in 1949. Despite the ongoing Cultural 
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Revolution, the US and PRC managed to establish diplomatic relations that were the foundation 
of the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy. The historic summit in 1972 between President 
Nixon and Mao not only separated the PRC from the remaining Soviet communist bloc, but the 
improved relations also gave the PRC the opportunity to become a third world power supported 
by the US. While the US and PRC became more friendly, this initiative damaged U.S. 
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Impact on US-Japan Bilateral relations 
After its defeat in World War II, Japan was under the US military occupation until 1952. 
To prepare for the end of occupation, the US and Japan “signed a bilateral security treaty that 
stationed US forces in Japan and served as the foundation for the post-occupation US-Japan 
security relationship” (Miller 2011, 88). This US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty allowed the 
United States to retain troops in Japan following the end of occupation, including in Okinawa, 
which became a U.S. territory with Japan accorded “residual sovereignty.” This allowed US 
authorities to appropriate land to build and expand military bases that were used to project 
American power in the region, including support for US and coalition forces during the Korean 
War. By 1954, Japan and the US signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement through 
which the US provided weapons and training to the Japanese. The provision of weapons and 
training, however, brought the controversy of rearmament in Japan to a head. In 1960, the US 
and Japan signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which allowed the US to retain 
troops in Japan and establish bases (Miller 2011; Maizland & Xu 2019). Under Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution imposed by U.S. occupation authorities in 1947, Japan formally 
disavowed war and pledged not to maintain military forces or develop offensive capabilities that 
would allow for militarization (Library of Congress 2020). Although the United States later 
sought to encourage Japan to strengthen its military capabilities so that it could defend itself and 
contribute to Cold War interventions, Japanese citizens generally came to support the peace 
clause and was militarization was unpopular with many Japanese citizens (Miller 2011). By 
1964, when Eisaku Sato came to power as the Prime Minister of Japan, China had begun its 
development of nuclear weapons but even though this posed a threat to Japan, Japan renounced 
nuclear weapons and preferred to be protected by the US nuclear umbrella (Hoey 2015). As 
Japan became wary of China’s growing nuclear capabilities and looked to the US’ protection, the 
United States placed Japan on its low priority rung as Kissinger “found it difficult to take a 
nation of ‘little Sony salesmen’ seriously” (Hoey 2012, 56). 
Eisaku Sato, Nobel Peace Prize winner and a disciple of Yoshida, led Japan from 1964 
until 1972 as Prime Minister (Ayako 2008). He was an adamant supporter of the United States, 
so much so, that during the 1971 Nixon Shocks Sato recognized the adverse impacts of Nixon’s 
new economic policies; however, he acknowledged “the United States remained the ‘pivot’ of 
Japan's foreign policy” (Reston 1971). Sato’s time in office faced the neglect of the US, 
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Okinawan reversion, US rapprochement with China, the Nixon Shocks, and Peking’s accusations 
that Japan had military and expansionist ambitions in the region, among other issues. He was 
committed to peace within the new world order, a proponent of nuclear non-proliferation, and a 
supporter of Japan’s security agreement with the US (Ayako 2008). An important issue which 
began before his time as Prime Minister, but would be negotiated by his government, was the 
Okinawan reversion. The proposal for reversion came during the Vietnam War; the Japanese 
feared that the alliance with the US would require Japan to assist in the US’ war (Mendel, Jr. 
1967). 
US-Japanese relations from 1969 thru 1973 experienced many tensions in large part due 
to the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Okinawa, a part of the Ryukyu Islands, after World War II 
fell under American influence; before the American period of rule, Okinawa was ruled by Japan 
and prior to Japan was a territory of China. American presence in Okinawa was well known as it 
was a military stronghold for the US in the Pacific (Yoshida 2001). In 1965, the US sent more 
than $24 million in assistance to the Ryukyu Islands. The US took control of the island’s electric, 
water, and developmental loan corporations; the US was also a very large employer as many 
locals worked on US military bases. However, the Okinawans did suffer under US occupation; 
despite democratic systems being put in place, the Okinawans were ruled by executive orders by 
US personnel:  
No amount of American goodwill and generosity or importation of its “civilized” modes 
of life…satisfied the Okinawan people’s wishes for an end to foreign military occupation 
or for the restoration of their political and social rights and privileges as Japanese citizens 
protected by the Japanese constitutions (Yoshida 2001, xiii). 
US presence in Okinawa in the 1960’s was fundamental to the US war effort in Vietnam, often 
costing the Okinawan people the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the US government and 
promised by President Truman in 1945 following the end of WWII. Secretary of State William 
Rogers would go on to say:  
It was clear in 1969, it remains clear today, that a continuance of a situation in which a 
million Japanese are still living under United States military administration more than 25 
years after the end of World War II has subjected our position in the Ryukyu Islands and 
our relationship with Japan to increasing strain. Such a situation is no longer tenable. It is 
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not keeping with our national character or our national interest. Nor is it consistent with 
history (US Department of State 1972, 520).  
Calls for Okinawan reversion surfaced under Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (1960-1964); 
however, Ikeda died only a few months after proposing this intention for reversion, his successor 
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato planned to pursue Okinawan reversion (Takizawa 1971).  
 The Chinese feared the Okinawan reversion as a possible step toward Japan’s 
remilitarization, which China opposed due to the atrocities that imperial Japan had committed 
against China during the Second World War (LaFeber 1970; Johnson 1972). With ongoing US 
rapprochement with China and the Nixon Administration’s agenda, the Okinawan reversion was 
timed to fuel Chinese fear and worry.  
 Violence became a common theme during the fight against US occupation and for 
Okinawan Reversion to Japan. On February 4, 1969, Okinawan workers began a strike against 
B-52 bombers that were sent from a base on the island to carry out missions against the North 
Vietnamese during the ongoing Vietnam War (Takizawa 1971). It is estimated that 55,000 
workers protested on February 4th (Kim 1973). By April 23, violence erupted in what became 
known as Okinawan Day (Takizawa 1971). Okinawan Day violence continued and on April 28, 
1969, “150,000 leftists” protested for the reversion of Okinawa and the termination of the US-
Japan Security Treaty (Kim 1973, 1025). Just over a month later on June 5, 20,000 Okinawan 
workers went on strike at a US military base on the island during which seven socialist leaders 
were stabbed with bayonets (Takizawa 1971). This culminated in the Okinawan people learning 
that the US was storing nerve gas and chemical weapons on the island, which led to speculations 
about the possible use of the weapons on the Okinawan people; this became “an ominous sign of 
America’s bad faith” (Takizawa 1971, 500).  As Sato prepared for a trip to the US to discuss 
relations and Okinawa, 860,000 protesters demanded Okinawan reversion on October 21, 1969 
(Kim 1973). A month later on November 16, 720,000 Japanese protested Sato’s diplomatic trip 
to the US. By January 1970, 5,000 Okinawan workers came into conflict with US soldiers across 
the island.  
 The US-Japan Security Treaty was due for renewal in 1970 which was for Japan an 
alliance with the US targeting North Korea and the PRC; the developments in Okinawa showed 
that the people in Japan would not support a renewal without a change in the Okinawa situation 
(LaFeber 1970; Kim 1973). This and the Vietnam War left the Japanese government in tense 
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relations with the United States. This created a tense backdrop to negotiations over the US-Japan 
Security Treaty, which was due for renewal in 1970; the developments in Okinawa showed that 
the Japanese public would not support a renewal without a change in the Okinawa situation 
(LaFeber 1970; Kim 1973).  
 The US finally settled the Okinawan Reversion with the signing of the Okinawa 
Reversion Agreement on June 17, 1971 (Kim 1973). The Agreement turned Okinawa back over 
to Japanese control with many stipulations over the US continual presence in the region:  
Terms of reversion: (1) The U.S. would retain 88 major military facilities and 
installations after reversion, while returning 46 minor ones to Japan; (2) Japan would pay 
$320 million over a 5-year period for the civilian and military facilities to be turned over 
to Japan at the time of reversion; (3) the Voice of America (V.O.A) would be allowed to 
operate for five years after reversion; (4) the Okinawans would renounce their claims 
against the U.S. except in specific areas already agreed upon by the U.S.; (5) American 
enterprises and businessmen in Okinawa would not be discriminated against after 
reversion; and (6) Japan was to assume major responsibilities for local defense by 
dispatching 6,800 troops to Okinawa by July 1, 1973 (Kim 1973, 1028-1029).  
The US would remain a military presence in Japan, as the US retained control of the majority of 
US bases on the island and guaranteed American interests in this agreement. Retaining US 
presence was not the goal of Okinawan reversion; however, US presence remained after the 
signing of the agreement due to the Mutual Security Treaty. In accordance with the treaty, Sato 
allowed the US to place nuclear weapons on Okinawa following reversion, and Sato agreed to 
impose an export quota on textiles to the US (Hoey 2012). The US also received concessions 
from the Japanese on its own military buildup and the provision of defense, as called for under 
the Nixon Doctrine. After years of US military control, Okinawa was distinct from the rest of 
Japan; the US’ departure from Okinawa left the economically underdeveloped island in the 
hands of the Japanese to industrialize.  
 With reversion negotiated, US and Japanese relations could have improved, but with the 
Nixon Administration’s overriding concern for rapprochement with China, relations remained 
strained. On July 15, 1971 Nixon announced his trip to China (Richard Nixon Foundation 2014). 
This announcement came as a surprise not only to the American public but to U.S. allies as well, 
since top U.S. and Chinese officials had kept negotiations secret; this announcement also took 
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the Sato government by surprise and created serious anger and embarrassment over the lack of 
prior consultation (Kim 1973). The U.S. government ultimately put rapprochement with China 
first and caused a sense of betrayal on the part of the Japanese government since “three weeks 
before the announcement of the China trip the Prime Minister … was told that the U.S. would 
make no move toward recognition of China without previous consultation” (Overholt 1973, 714).  
Following the trip announcement embarrassment, Nixon imposed taxes on Japanese goods, 
enacted quotas on Japanese textiles, and forced a yen revaluation (Kim 1973). While these 
impositions by the Nixon Administration were unexpected, they were not exactly surprising as 
the US and Sato’s government had its disagreements. These disagreements stemmed from, 
“Japan's slow trade liberalization, its slow revaluation of the yen, its inability to keep secrets, and 
Prime Minister Sato's failure to honor promises regarding textile concessions” (Overholt 1973, 
714). These issues intensified during Nixon’s presidency “exacerbated by some personal 
animosities between American and Japanese officials” (Overholt 1973, 714).  
These acts have been termed the Nixon Shocks, after which Sato’s opponents called for 
the renegotiation of the reversion agreement (Kim 1973). Renegotiation was called for as a result 
of the changed circumstances between the US and China. The agreement was formulated during 
the “Nixon-Sato Joint Communique… which assumed the continuation of Sino-American 
confrontation” which no longer held true after Nixon’s surprise visit to the PRC (Kim 1973, 
1029-1030). Following the Nixon Shocks, Sato’s popularity suffered; The New York Times in 
1971 noted, Sato “has clearly been hurt politically by seeming to be treated rather casually by an 
American Government that he has usually tried to support” (Reston 1971). Okinawan Reversion 
became an important issue in US-Japanese relations once again pressuring Sato, following the 
Nixon Shocks. 
 Prior to the unexpected announcement of Nixon’s visit to China, Japanese foreign policy 
toward China had been guided by the U.S. policy of non-recognition of the PRC and support for 
the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. Despite the Yoshida government’s early interest in 
pursuing normal relations with the PRC, the United States successfully pressured Japan to 
subordinate Japanese policy to America’s anti-communist containment strategy in return for U.S. 
commitment to defend Japan, as formalized in the 1951 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (Sato 
1975; Hoey 2015). Beginning in 1961 until 1970, the United States and Japan cosponsored 
annual resolutions in the General Assembly calling for a two-thirds majority in order for the PRC 
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to be seated in the United Nations, thus removing the ROC. 1970 saw the Albanian Resolution, 
which called for PRC representation within the UN, reach a majority, but not the needed two-
thirds. Kissinger saw the PRC becoming a member of the UN with possible benefits to the US; 
however, he called for dual representation which allowed for both the PRC and ROC to have 
seats. Therefore, in 1970 the ROC, Japan, and the US coordinated their policies so as to save the 
ROC’s seat. Japan in the spring of 1971 awaited policy direction regarding the seat from the US; 
however, the U.S. State Department, estranged from the White House, never informed the 
Japanese about the impending shift in U.S. strategy. It was said that “such a delay, inexplicable 
to the press and to friendly states (especially Japan) was felt to effectively throw away any 
chance of saving the ROC seat” (Hoey 2015, 146). The reasoning for the delay was soon 
revealed as just weeks later Nixon announced his official trip to China. As Japan and the United 
States worked to retain Taiwan’s seat in the UN against the PRC’s bid, the United States was 
making secret agreements with the PRC for better relations, undercutting the Japanese 
government.  
The United States ultimately left Sato to the wolves; he was forced into retirement in 
1972 following these events which transpired without his knowledge. Another nail in the coffin 
came with Nixon’s New Economic Policy which unpegged the US dollar from the gold standard 
and placed a 10 percent tariff on imports to the United States (Sato 1975). These economic 
changes greatly affected the Japanese so much so that they “reduced America’s credibility in the 
eyes of most Japanese” (Sato 1975, 157).  Trade between the two nations became more frictional 
with the quotas and tariffs in place and worsened as the United States began experiencing a trade 
deficit with Japan in the 1970’s (Burton-Christie and Cheng 1983). The trade imbalance received 
attention as the US government called on the Japanese to purchase more American goods, while 
at the same time imposing quotas on soybean exports to Japan (Sato 1975). The US economic 
relationship with Japan became an important signal of deteriorating relations between the two 
nations.  
 As the United States became more estranged from Japan and closer with China, the 
Middle East was experiencing a crisis of its own which culminated in the Arab-Israel Conflict of 
1973, also known as the Yom Kippur War. On October 6, 1973, the combined forces of Egypt 
and Syria attacked Israel; the attack inundated Israeli forces at first (Harms & Ferry 2017). The 
USSR had provided equipment and weapons to the Egyptians and Israel requested US military 
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aid. Kissinger, still leading US foreign policy, worried about the repercussions of supplying 
Israel, such as the détente with the USSR and an Arab oil embargo. When the USSR resupplied 
Egypt, the United States became involved with “unprecedented airlifts to Israel” and a $2.2 
billion in aid (Harms & Ferry 2017, 125). The backlash from the Arab nations resulted in OPEC 
placing an oil embargo on the United States and its supporters. As an ally of the US, Japan was 
severely affected by this oil embargo, experiencing an economic recession as it was almost 
exclusively dependent on oil imports (Sato 1975).  
 These events precipitated an economic recession driven by an oil shortage and large price 
increases (Sato 1975). Japan, at the time the third largest economy in the world, was highly 
reliant on foreign fuel for its industry and production; Japan suffered more devastating 
consequences than the US and Western Europe did as a consequence of being an ally to the US. 
This left Japan to engage in resource diplomacy – a way of managing relations which prioritizes 
the acquisition resources and energy sources – which proved to go against US interests. As the 
Yom Kippur War came to an end, negotiations were being made between the US and USSR, but 
Kissinger also made agreements with Middle Eastern leaders (Harms & Ferry 2017). Israel had 
gained land from both Syria, in Golan Heights, and from Egypt, in Sinai. Japan suffering from 
the embargo called on Israel to withdraw from the land it had captured in this conflict and the 
1967 Six-Day War and recognized the Palestinian cause (Harms & Ferry 2017; Naramoto 1991). 
The United States resented Japan’s call for Israel’s withdrawal and this disagreement increased 
tensions in US-Japanese relations once more. 
 The Yom Kippur War saw Japan make a foreign policy decision that was not influenced 
by US policy in the Middle East; Japan “broke ranks with the United States on Middle East 
policy” (Naramoto 1991, 79). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) drove Japanese policy 
and it was certainly concerned about oil and trade; Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
approved of the policies made by the MOFA and executed the policies as MOFA designed. 
Japan threatened in its new policy implemented by MOFA to “reconsider its policy toward 
Israel” (Naramoto 1991, 80). “Reconsider” was a polarizing word in this context; however, the 
Saudi government urged the Japanese government to use “reconsider” in order to be free of the 
oil embargo. Economic conditions in Japan prevailed and the US- Japanese relations were sullied 
as Japan abandoned a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in supporting Israel. In response to 
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Japan’s official statements on the Arab-Israel Conflict, the oil embargo was lifted on oil exports 
to Japan.  
 Tenuous” has been the word often used to describe US-Japanese relations between 1969 
and 1973 (Sato 1975, 157). As the United States turned toward the Chinese government, its 
commitments to Japan were neglected and domestic actors within Japan bristled against the US-
Japanese alliance. Okinawa was a major contributor to complications between the United States 
and Japan during the period stretching from the mid-1960’s until its reversion in 1972. The 
occupying U.S. forces in Okinawa were a reminder of the Japanese loss of WWII and raised 
concerns that Japan could be pulled into one of America’s wars against communism, especially 
the Vietnam War as U.S. military bases in Okinawa were essential to the U.S. war effort. The 
U.S. push for Japan’s remilitarization disregarded Japan’s peace clause and insulted many 
Japanese. Many more insults ensued as Nixon shocked the world with his visit to China which 
showed his blatant disregard for Sato by keeping him in the dark about the secret talks with 
China. On top of the Nixon administration’s absence of consultation with Japan over China 
policy, U.S.-Japan relations were also fraught due to economic competition, with calls in the 
United States to get tough with Japan and Japanese resentment over US pressures. However, the 
importance of the US-Japan security relationship was never a calculation in guaranteeing 
economic concessions from the Japanese (Curtis 2000). As Japan’s economy grew, the Nixon 
Administration imposed tariffs and quotas on Japanese imports and pressured Japan to revalue 
the yen. When Japan’s close alliance with the United States created an immediate economic 
threat due to the oil embargo placed on U.S. allies during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Japan 
began forging a policy which would serve its own interests, and the United States took offense. 
The United States neglected Japan while the United States was an influential piece in the puzzle 
of Japanese foreign policy; Japan’s initiative to form policy in response to its immediate threats 
took pertinence over US-Japanese relations after being left behind and left out of many decisions 
with such an important ally. As US-China relations improved, US-Japanese relations suffered. 
This is evidenced by the divergent evolution of policy between the United States and Japan 
during rapprochement with the PRC.  
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Impact on US-India Bilateral Relations 
Within the trilateral relationship of US-India-China, Pakistan plays such an important 
role that India’s relations with China and with the United States cannot be understood without 
analyzing the relationship that each of these countries has with Pakistan. China and Pakistan, 
which both have territorial disputes with India, share a strategic interest in restraining India’s 
growth. Although Pakistan joined a US-led military alliance in the 1950s in an effort to improve 
its security situation vis-à-vis India, it also cultivated close relations with the People’s Republic 
of China (Mahdi 1986, 61). In contrast, territorial disputes between India and the PRC ensured a 
bitter rivalry between these two countries. After the Kennedy administration sided with India in 
the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, Sino-Pakistan relations steadily improved and China began 
to use Pakistan as a mechanism to contain India by providing significant economic and military 
assistance (Mahdi 1986, 63-65). China’s attempts to use Pakistan to balance Indian influence in 
the region included support for Pakistan in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the second violent 
conflict over the state of Jammu and Kashmir which was claimed by both Hindu-majority India 
and Muslim-majority Pakistan.  
Since independence from Britain in 1947, India pursued a policy of nonalignment, 
including a very prominent role at the Bandung Conference of 1955, where representatives from 
various newly Asian and African nations called for economic and cultural cooperation among 
third world countries to avoid having to take sides in the Cold War. The Non-aligned Movement 
(NAM) began in the bipolar Cold War world; the objective of this movement was to allow 
nations to be independent of both the United States and USSR’s influence (NTI 2021). NAM’s 
motto is to “create an independent path in world politics that would not result in member States 
becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers” (NTI 2021). The movement had 
four summits between 1961 and 1973. India, a member of NAM, conducted foreign policy in 
accordance with nonalignment and maintaining independence from the US-USSR rivalry. India 
has historically held a policy of nonalignment. The Non-aligned Movement (NAM) began in the 
bipolar 1961 Cold War world; the objective of this movement was to allow nations to be 
independent of the US’ and USSR’s influence (NTI 2021). NAM’s motto is to “create an 
independent path in world politics that would not result in member States becoming pawns in the 
struggles between the major powers” (NTI 2021). The movement had four summits between 
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1961 and 1973. India, a member of NAM, conducted foreign policy in accordance with 
nonalignment and maintaining independence from the US-USSR rivalry.   
The United States was initially wary of NAM, fearing that it signaled a leftist turn in the 
ideological orientation of newly independent nations (“Bandung Conference”) and this translated 
into an ambivalent stance toward India. However, in 1962, India and China engaged in a war 
along their border and China’s victory worried the United States, prompting the Kennedy 
administration to provide military support to India (Agarwal 2014-2015). US military support for 
India in this war represented a monumental shift since the US had held a long standing pro-
Pakistani stance. Pakistan, whose greatest threat was India, found President Kennedy’s aid to be 
a signal of souring relations. This left Pakistan to utilize its relationship with the PRC to balance 
the new-found US-India friendship; Pakistan and China formed their own alliance in response to 
the combined power of India and the US. After years of ruffled relations and with the change of 
administrations in both Pakistan and the US, the US and Pakistan began to cooperate once again 
and coordinate foreign policy. With improved US relations with Pakistan, India would 
experience hostile relations with the US. 
Not only was nonalignment an issue for Nixon but so was his relationship with Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi. Gandhi and Nixon, according to Kissinger (1979), “were not intended by 
fate to be personally congenial” as she “brought out all of Nixon’s latent insecurities” (848). 
Despite Nixon’s attitudes, India remained a recipient of $4.2 billion in aid between 1965 and 
1971 (Kissinger 1979). However, Pakistan enjoyed presidential preference during the Nixon 
years, as Nixon felt respected by the Pakistani government, a contrast to his relations with 
India’s government. The Nixon Administration not only preferred Pakistan due to its role in 
rapprochement, but the level of respect Nixon received from its leaders.   
By 1969, Pakistan had been a US ally for over a decade and had engaged in four alliance 
agreements since 1954 (Khan 1985). The US Pakistan Alliance allowed the US to contain 
communism while Pakistan used the alliance to contain India, but following the Indo-Pakistan 
War of 1965, US-Pakistan relations faltered; accordingly, Pakistan was not mentioned in the 
1969-1970 Senate hearings on US security commitments. The decline in US-Pakistan 
cooperation coincided with Pakistan becoming an ally of the PRC which was despised by 
Kennedy and Johnson, yet proved useful for Nixon. Following the improvement in relations with 
the PRC, the US tilted toward Pakistan in 1971 during the conflict between Pakistan and India 
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(Goh 2005). Kissinger said, “We can’t allow a friend of ours and China’s to get screwed in a 
conflict with a friend of Russia’s [India]” (Goh 2005, 481). 
 The first contact made between the PRC and US occurred in August of 1969 through the 
Pakistani channel (Agarwal 2014-2015). By October of 1970, President Khan officially met with 
Nixon in Washington, D.C and began discussing possible US-PRC relations. Two months later 
in December 1970, the Chinese messaged the US through the Pakistani channel and expressed 
approval for rapprochement with the United States. Nixon worried about possible rapprochement 
with China as tensions intensified between Pakistan and India, as India began supplying support 
for successionist East Pakistan in April of 1971. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, saw the 
genocide and political repression in East Pakistan as causing instability in Southeast Asia. The 
USSR became involved with India in response to the “bloodshed and repression” and the 
formation of a US-Pakistan-China relationship (Agarwal 2014-2015, 28). The USSR assisted 
India, and this culminated in Nixon and Kissinger viewing India as a dependent of the USSR. 
This reaffirmed views that India’s nonalignment policies were inherently anti-American.   
 Kissinger believed that India had worked “tenaciously and skillfully to undermine the 
military relationship between Pakistan and the United States” and in doing so had become reliant 
on Soviet arms and aid (Kissinger 1979, 864). In 1970, India was spending $350 million on 
military supplies; that same year the United States, in return for its role in rapprochement, gifted 
Pakistan $40-$50 million in military machinery but did not provide tanks or artillery. India 
retaliated against this gift with claims that the US was violating India’s sovereignty. This 
complication was one of many in US-India relations which soured future prospects. This would 
be one event which helps to explain why in 1971, Kissinger (1979) describes relations with India 
as “exasperatedly strained cordiality” (849). In addition to tension within relations, Kissinger had 
two other issues in dealing with India: (1) the impact of public opinion on Pakistan and (2) the 
“indiscipline of [the US] bureaucracy” (Kissinger 1979, 856). 
 As the United States had in place an arms embargo on Pakistan for a few years following 
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, supplies were funneled to Pakistan through Iran and Jordon with 
the knowledge of the Nixon Administration (Agarwal 2014-2015). US’ defiance of its own arms 
embargo against Pakistan shows the importance of Pakistan to Nixon; Pakistan was the emissary 
through which rapprochement with the Chinese would be possible.  
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 July of 1971 saw Kissinger’s secret visit to China during the emergence of the India-
Pakistani Conflict.  The secret trip to also included stops to India and Pakistan, which covered 
the true motives of Kissinger’s travels to Asia (Agarwal 2014-2015). While in India, the leaders 
of India pushed for the cutting of aid to Pakistan; Kissinger refused to cut aid to Pakistan. Rather 
the US would come to cut aid to India. In August 1971, following Kissinger’s secret trip, the 
USSR and India signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. This was 
in response to the relationships complicating the situation in Southeast Asia.  
India relied on the US prior to this conflict for support against China; however, during the 
1971 war the USSR became India’s new lifeline. From 1965 to 1974, the USSR was India 
primary arms supplier, sending $1375 million (in 1978 USD) worth of arms in comparison to the 
US’ arms transfer total of $41 million (Menon 1978, 740). In addition to arms, India was the 
largest recipient of the USSR’s economic aid for over twenty years, 1954-1975.  The US, on the 
other hand, became less engaged in India. In 1970, the US accounted for 48 percent of India’s 
exports; meanwhile, in 1975, the US accounted for solely 12 percent of India’s exports (Menon 
1978, 746). India also experienced a decrease in US imports, receiving 68 percent of its import 
from the US in 1970, yet only 22 percent by 1975 (Menon 1978, 747). Disengagement with India 
was a result of US rapprochement which the Nixon Administration gave little mind to. So much 
so that Kissinger said, “hell if we could reestablish relations with Communist China, we can 
always get the Indians back whenever we want to later…” (Agarwal 2014-2015, 32-33).  
As the conflict became inevitable between India and Pakistan the US began to interfere in 
war by urging China to engage on behalf of Pakistan against India (Agarwal 2014-2015). In 
urging China to intervene, the Nixon and Kissinger “agreed to transfer military planes to the 
Chinese” (Agarwal 2014-2015, 34). China in response to US requests agreed to support Pakistan 
should India attack Pakistan. Accordingly, tensions rose between China and India during the 
Sino-Soviet clash (Menon 1978). 
Rapprochement was so important to Nixon that the genocide in East Pakistan was 
ignored and the administration worked to hush criticism of Yahya. Ultimately, Congress stepped 
in and blocked US aid for Pakistan. Additionally, the overlooked State Department also worked 
against the Pakistani government by developing a new arms embargo and ending military and 
economic aid to the Pakistanis, without White House input (Kissinger 1979). Despite the White 
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House’s efforts, condemnation came to a head from within which came to become known as the 
Blood Telegram on April 6, 1971. 
The Blood Telegram was the result of the chaos in East Pakistan due to the on-going 
genocide. As many were not within the Nixon-Kissinger loop, the State Department and those 
serving in foreign service were uninformed as to the reason for US continued support of 
Pakistan. Archer Blood’s “Blood Telegram” is known as “one of the strongest worded Dissent 
Channels written by a Foreign Service Officer to the department” (Agarwal 2014-2015, 31-32). 
The Telegram is a critique of the US government and its neglect of the growing humanitarian 
crisis:  
…Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our 
government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful 
measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate 
the West [Pakistan] dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative 
international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what 
many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent 
President Yahya a message2 defending democracy, [condemning] arrest of leader of 
democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-West) and calling for end to 
repressive measures and bloodshed. In our most recent policy paper for Pakistan,3 our 
interests in Pakistan were defined as primarily humanitarian, rather than strategic. But we 
have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in 
which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely internal matter 
of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional 
public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true 
and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected in order to salvage 
our nationʼs position as a moral leader of the free world. (US Department of State n.d., 
“Telegram”).  
 
The lack of communication between departments caused additional complications for the Nixon 
Administration, in addition to the already looming complications Nixon and Kissinger were 
facing with India, Pakistan, China, and the USSR. Archer Blood was recalled and his career as a 
foreign service officer was terminated. The US within this context made foreign policy initiatives 
more difficult, the secrecy not only caused issues within, but with relations with India (this same 
situation also applies toward Japan).  
As conflict emerged between India and Pakistan, and approximately eight to ten million 
refugees flooded into India due to the West Pakistani genocide being carried out in East Pakistan, 
the US sided with West Pakistan as it was essential to rapprochement which forced India into an 
alliance with the USSR (Agarwal 2014-2015). The United States prioritized its relationship with 
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Pakistan as Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan, was key to US foreign policy initiatives under 
Nixon and Kissinger’s leadership. Khan, the architect of US official trips to China, was 
threatened by Indian intervention which led the US to side with Pakistan as any threat to Pakistan 
translated to a threat to US-China rapprochement. Nixon in 1971 wrote, “To all hands. Don’t 
squeeze Yahya at this time. RN” (Kissinger 1979, 856) Thus, Nixon supported Yahya and chose 
to tilt toward Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, even in the face of condemnation over 
America’s lack of action during the ongoing genocide.  
The emerging conflict had varying interpretations. The United States saw this as a proxy 
conflict with the USSR, while India saw the conflict as a regional problem creating instability 
within Asia. The United States viewed the effects of the war in terms of its relations with the 
PRC and the Pakistani channel; however, India was worrying about the effects of East Pakistan 
succession (including the flow of refugees to India).  
 In May 1971, Nixon threatened India’s economic aid should it attack Pakistan (Agarwal 
2014-2015). On December 6, 1971, the US cut off economic, military, and all other forms of aid; 
however, Pakistan did attack first on December 3. The conflict lasted just days (December 3, 
1971-December 16,1971) as India quickly was victorious against the Pakistani military. With the 
Indian victory, East Pakistan declared its independence as the new nation of Bangladesh.  
 Fearing bad press and its effects on rapprochement following Pakistan’s defeat, the 
Nixon Administration authorized Task Force 74, which sent a naval force including the USS 
Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal (Madan 2020).  In the UN Security Council, the US initiative 
to blame India for the emerging conflict with India backfired as France and England backed the 
Soviet stance instead. After Bangladesh gained its independence, the United States would not 
recognize its statehood in accordance with its policy to please Pakistan and the PRC; not 
recognizing Bangladesh was an affront to the Indian government who made it a policy priority 
(Madan 2020, 251). Continued U.S. support of Pakistan greatly damaged US-India bilateral 
relations.   
 “Rapprochement with China considerably diminished India’s importance in the US 
strategic framework” (Madan 2020, 222). Leaders in India viewed rapprochement with China as 
the United States working in collaboration with both China and Pakistan against the interests of 
India. This was an issue of importance for India as it had relied on U.S. assistance against China. 
“One unquestionable result of the war was that US-India relations had reached their lowest 
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point” (Madan 2020, 248). While the United States thought relations would resume with India 
following the conflict, they did not. The United States made China their clear priority and did 
would not engage India until after Nixon’s 1972 trip to China. As the United States arranged a 
new order in Asia, it neglected India’s role in this new order. Gandhi refused to accept this new 
American narrative that left India out of Asian affairs (Madan 2020). The US-India relationship 
remained complicated.  
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Conclusions and Implications 
 The relationship between the US and China has been tumultuous at best over the past 
decade as competition between the two nations has increased. Not only has competition been 
economic but it has been security and technologically based. The Chinese military and navy 
(PLA – People’s Liberation Army and PLAN - People’s Liberation Army Navy) have seen 
growth at unprecedented rates in the past decade. This should raise concern. If the US and its 
allies (India and Japan) cannot work toward an effective containment policy, US national 
interests could be at stake. A world where China reigns supreme will threaten democratic 
principles worldwide. Already in our world, democracy has been threatened by authoritarian 
governments around the world (i.e., Myanmar Coup and Prime Minister Orbán in Hungary). The 
presence of a world leader such as China should be enough to motivate democracies around the 
world to action.  
 Because of the possible threats the US faces, understanding US-India and US-Japan 
relations is essential. The US cannot work alone in Asia Pacific any longer. Understanding the 
stimulus that drives US bilateral relations in Asia with India and Japan will become an important 
talking point as China continues to grow. The evidence has shown there is a relationship that 
exists between US-China relations and the direct, inverse effect it has on US-Japan and US-India 
relations.  
 US-China relations are ever-evolving, and right now it is clear that hostility reigns within 
their interactions, but hostility has not always existed. US-China interactions are key in 
determining the future of US foreign policy initiatives and US security. India and Japan are 
quintessential in the response the US gives to China’s signals. Bilateral relations and the trilateral 
relations between all three nations (US, India, Japan) signal strength and resistance to hostile 
actions. These relationships are/will be the foundation of US foreign policy and security for 
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Research to Come:  
 
The Reagan Administration 
 
- The Reagan Administration  
 
- Reagan’s Foreign Policy and Reagan’s New Conservatism 
 
- US-Japan Relations During the Ronald Reagan Administration  
 
- US-India Relations During the Ronald Reagan Administration  
 
 
The Trump Administration  
 
- The Trump Administration  
- Trump on Foreign Policy  
- US-Japan Relations During the Trump Administration  
- US-India Relations During the Trump Administration 
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